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Community Communications Company (CCC) held a revocable, nonexclusive permit which was granted by the City of Boulder,
Colorado (Boulder) to operate a cable television service within the city
limits.' Although CCC was authorized to provide cable service to the
entire city, 2 the company only serviced the University Hill area of
Boulder, an area where only twenty percent of the city's population

lived.

3

In May 1979, CCC expressed a desire to expand cable television
service to other areas of the city 4 as a result of markedly improved
technology. 5 The new technology, however, afforded opportunities

to potential competitors as well,0 and in July, 1979 Boulder Communications Company (BCC) expressed an interest in obtaining a permit

and in competing with CCC. 7 The City Council reviewed the cable

I Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035. 1036 (D.
Colo.), revd and remanded. 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835
(1982). The permit was issued to a predecessor corporation in 1964. This permit derived from an
ordinance which was enacted by the Boulder City Council. Id. The ordinance permitted CCC to
use public ways in Boulder for a period of twenty years to string cables for a community antenna
system, or cable television. Id.
2 Id.
' Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct.835, 837 (1982). It would
have been impractical for CCC to service the entire city. Until February 1980, CCC provided
retransmission of television signals from television stations in Denver and from one station in
Cheyenne, Wyoming. Id. These television signals were available to all the residents of Boulder
except those in the University Hill area. University Hill residents were unable to receive broadcast television signals because of geographic factors. Id. Accordingly, CCC conducted a very
limited cable business.
4 Id. at 837. CCC desired to establish an earth station for the reception of remote channels
via satellite. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (D.
Colo.), rev'd and remanded, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835
(1982).
' Satellite technology enabled CCC to offer Boulder's citizens an increased variety of
programming, including movies, sports, and channels from distant major cities. Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1036 (D. Colo.), rev'd and
remanded, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982). The
district court stated: "Future potential for cable television is referred to as 'blue sky' indicating
that virtualy unlimited technological improvements are still expected." Id. at 1037.
8 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835, 837 (1982).
The
new technology prompted a rapid growth in the cable television industry. Cable television
became much more attractive to the public, thereby increasing the market demand for expanded
cable television services. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp.
1035, 1036-37 (D. Colo.), rev'd and remanded, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd and
remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835, 837 (1982). BCC
sent a letter to the Boulder City Council outlining its proposals for a new cable system and stating
835
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television industry8 in view of the many changes which had occurred

since the enactment of the original ordinance dealing with cable
television, and enacted two emergency ordinances 9 which restricted
CCC from expanding its cable television business into other areas of
the City for a period of three months. 10 During this three month
period the City Council drafted a model ordinance which provided
for pervasive city control over the eventual cable television operator in

Boulder. "
CCC, seeking a preliminary injunction, brought suit against the
City, 12 alleging that enactment of the two ordinances violated section

one of the Sherman Act.' 3 Boulder contended that its conduct was

not violative of the antitrust laws since it was immune under the state

its intention "to begin building its system as soon as feasible after the City grants BCC its
permit." Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035. 1037 (D.
Colo.), rev'd and remanded, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded. 102 S. Ct. 835

(1982).
8 The City Council and the Boulder City Manager hired a consultant and held a number of
meetings in an attempt to formulate a governmental response to the industry. Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (D. Colo.), rev'd and
remanded, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982). The
consultant informed the city that a cable system could easily become a natural monopoly. Id.
The City Council and City Manager feared that CCC might not be the best operator, but would
nonetheless remain the only operator in Boulder because it was already established in the area.
Id.
, Id. The first ordinance unilaterally amended the original ordinance and imposed a 90 day
moratorium on CCC's cable expansion in Boulder. City of Boulder, Colo. Ordinance 4473 (Dec.
19, 1979). The second ordinance revoked and reenacted CCC's franchise to include the moratorium. City of Boulder, Colo. Ordinance 4472 (Dec. 19, 1979). The Boulder City Council sought
to justify the ordinances by claiming that the moratorium on CCC's expansion was essential to
serve the best interests of Boulder's citizens. The Council determined that an expansion of
Boulder's operation "would result in hindering the ability of other companies to compete in the
Boulder market," and would disrupt and impede the Council's attempt to draft a model cable
television ordinance which would best serve the ends of service and competition. id.
10 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835, 838 (1982).
11 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 710 (10th Cir. 1980)
(Markey, J., dissenting), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982). This model ordinance was
actually in the form of a contract to be entered into by the successful bidder.
12 CCC also brought suit against Boulder Communications Company. CCC alleged
that
BCC and Boulder conspired to restrict competition by replacing CCC with BCC. Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (D. Colo.), rev'd and
remanded, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982). The
district court maintained however, that although there was "some circumstantial evidence which
might indicate such a conspiracy, that evidence [was] insufficient to establish a probability that
the plaintiff will prevail on this claim." Id.
13 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See infra note 45 for the text of the Sherman Act. CCC maintained
that these ordinances prevented further expansion of the geographical area of its business, thus
amounting to a restraint of trade. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F.
Supp. 1035, 1038 (D. Colo.), reild and remanded, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd and
remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
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action doctrine' 4 delineated in Parker v. Brown,' 5 and that it was
validly exercising its police powers.' 8 The city asserted that its status
as a home rule municipality gave it power tantamount to that of the
state in matters of purely local concern. '7 The district court chose not
to address this question, but did consider whether the Parker exemption applied.' 8 In holding the Parker exemption to be "wholly inapplicable," ' 9 the court assumed that Boulder had the power to regulate
cable television 0 despite having grave doubts about whether cable
television was purely a matter of local concern.?' The district court
focused on the nature of the regulation and determined that the city's
formulation of governmental policy by requesting input from the
22
parties to be regulated was not a proper subject for immunity.

" Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (D. Colo.),
rev'd and remanded, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
For a discussion of the state action doctrine, see infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
" 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
16 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (D. Colo.),
revd and remanded, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
7 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (D. Colo.),
rev'd and remanded, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
The Colorado home rule amendment, Colo. Const. art. XX,§ 6, provides in pertinent part:
The people of each city or town of this state, having a population of two
thousand inhabitants . . . , are hereby vested with, and they shall always have,
power to make, amend, add to or replace the charter of said city or town, which

shall be its organic law and extend to all its local and municipal matters.
Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall
supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any
law of the state in conflict therewith.
Id.
The people of the City of Boulder elected home rule status on October 30, 1917. Brief for
Respondent at 15, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S.Ct. 1035 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent].
11Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1038-39 (D.
Colo.), rev'd and remanded, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835
(1982).
'9 Id. at 1039.
20

Id.

at 1038-39. The district court observed:
There is no Colorado case which characterizes the operations of cable television
companies as a matter of local concern. Obviously there are wider concerns, including interstate commerce, giving rise to some uncertainty about the power of the state
government in this regard, both in terms of an obstruction to interstate commerce,
and with respect to the First Amendment rights of communicators.

2, Id.

Id.
22Id. In deciding that immunity was not proper, the district court did not focus on the
moratorium imposed on CCC. See id. Rather, the court emphasized that the City in drafting the
model ordinance had "submitted it to the cable television industry with the request that those
who wished to make proposals to enter the Boulder market should give their comments on that
draft." Id. at 1038.
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Immunity was denied because of excessive involvement by private
parties in the legislative process. 23 Accordingly, CCC's motion for a
24
preliminary injunction was granted.
The City of Boulder appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit which reconsidered whether the city was
exempt from the antitrust laws.2 5 Chief Judge Seth, writing for the
majority, reversed the district court decision concluding that the regulation of cable television was within Boulder's authority,2 6 and that

the city was immune under the Parkerdoctrine. 27 The court reached
this conclusion because the regulation of cable television was a local
matter 28 and the city met the standards necessary to find a Parker

exemption. 2

Since Boulder had complete authority over local mat-

ters, 30 the court of appeals concluded that the city's enactment of the
challenged ordinances was equivalent to state action for Parkerimmunity purposes. 3 1 Boulder satisfied the state action immunity test 32
2 Id. at 1039.

24 Id. at 1040.
23 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 705 (10th Cir. 1980),
rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
28 Id. at 707. Following reversal by the court of appeals of the district court order granting a
preliminary injunction, the Boulder City Council passed a new ordinance. City of Boulder,
Colo. Ordinance 4515 (July 1, 1980). The ordinance placed a permanent geographic limitation
on CCC's pre-existing contract right to establish and operate a cable television communications
system throughout the City of Boulder. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
496 F. Supp. 823, 825-26 (D. Colo. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981).
CCC again sought a preliminary injunction which was granted by the district court. The Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded the case to allow the district
court to tailor more appropriate relief for both parties. Community Communications Co. v. City
of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1380 (10th Cir. 1981).
27 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 708 (10th Cir. 1980),
rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
28 Id. at 707. The court relied upon the holding in Manor Vail Condominium Ass'n v. Town
of Vail, Colo. -, 604 P.2d 1168 (1980) (en banc). Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 706-07 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835
(1982). In Manor Vail, the Colorado Supreme Court assumed that in the home rule context rate
regulation of cable television was a matter of local concern before considering whether the
regulation was permissible. -. Colo. at -. , 604 P.2d at 1171; see TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F.
Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), affd per curiam, 396 U.S. 556 (1970). But see United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); cf. People v. Mountain Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Colo.
167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952) (en bane) (regulation of telephone and telegraph company operating
within city is not local matter).
28 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 708 (10th Cir. 1980),
rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982). Whereas the district court focused on the manner in
which the model ordinance was drafted to determine immunity, see supra note 22, the court of
appeals deemed this to be inapposite. 630 F.2d at 706.
30 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
31 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 706-07 (10th Cir.
1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
32The state action immunity test was developed by a series of cases, see infra notes 47-104
and accompanying text, and expressly delineated in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
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because the city had clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a
policy regarding cable television 33 and had actively supervised this
policy. 34 Accordingly, Boulder was immune from antitrust violations.
Judge Markey authored a lengthy dissent in which he dealt with

the antitrust issue at considerable length.35 Judge Markey disagreed

with the majority on two fundamental points. First, he stated that
cable television was not a purely local matter. 36 Second, he maintained that Boulder's home rule status did not elevate it to the position
of the state for antitrust immunity purposes. 37 Judge Markey stated:
"The home rule status of Colorado cities, and the negative fact that
state articulation, expression, and supervision are totally absent cannot" confirm immunity on Boulder under the state action test. 38
Therefore, Judge Markey would have affirmed the injunction order. 39
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 40 and reversed over a strong dissent. The Court maintained that the ordinance

Midcal, 445 U.S. 97 (1980). A unanimous court (Justice Brennan did not participate) stated that
for state action immunity to apply "the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy'; [and] the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State
itself." Id. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978)).
The Alidcal court stressed that immunity depended upon state policy and state supervision.
Because of the home rule provision, Boulder's actions were in reality actions by the state, thus
immunity could be granted because there was a clearly articulated city policy and active city
supervision.
" Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 707-08 (10th Cir.
1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S.Ct. 835 (1982). The policy of Boulder was clear: one of
fostering competition. Id.
"' Id. at 708. Boulder actively supervised the policy by: 1. imposing a moratorium on
construction and expansion by CCC; 2. issuing civil and then criminal citations to cable workers
when they ignored the moratorium; and 3. drafting a model ordinance. Id.
"' Judge Markey did not view the antitrust issue as being dispositive, and would have
affirmed the district court on first amendment grounds so as to avoid having to interpret the
Colorado Constitution's home rule amendment. Id. at 711 n.2 (Markey, J., dissenting). Although he noted that the district court did not consider the first amendment issue to be ripe, see
id.
at 712 n.4 (Markey, J., dissenting), Judge Markey decided that the Boulder ordinances were
prior restraints on speech. Id. at 712 (Markey, J., dissenting).
Id. at 718 (Markey, J., dissenting); see United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S.
157 (1968) (community antenna television (CATV) systems covered by FCC regulations because
FCC has broad authority over all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio). See
also supra note 28.
"' Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 717 (10th Cir. 1980),
(Markey, J., dissenting), rev'd and remanded, 102 S.Ct. 835 (1982). By rejecting the majority
approach, Judge Markey emphasized the federalism concerns inherent in his reasoning. He
observed: "We are a nation not of 'city states' but of States." Id.
Id. at 719 (Markey, J., dissenting).
Id. at 720 (Markey, J., dissenting).
'o Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 450 U.S. 1039 (1981).
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would be subject to the antitrust laws "'unless it constituted action of
the State of Colorado itself ... or unless it constituted municipal
action in furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy." ' 4' The Court decided that the

Boulder ordinance met neither test. 42 Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, emphasized that the state action exemption which is
based upon the principle of limited state sovereignty immunizes states
43
as states and does not reach sovereign cities.
Sections one and two of the Sherman Act 44 speak in broad, all
encompassing language. 45 Literally construed, the Sherman Act
would hold every restraint of trade and every monopoly or attempt to
monopolize illegal. Courts, however, have refused to interpret the
46
Sherman Act in such a manner.
In Parker, the Supreme Court considered whether the pervasive
language of the Sherman Act applied to state action. 47 Brown, a
producer and packer of raisins, brought suit under the Sherman Act 48
to enjoin California officials from enforcing a marketing program for
the raisin industry. 49 The marketing program promoted a legitimate
state interest, 50 but restricted competition and maintained prices in
the distribution of the commodities. 5' The Court assumed that the

41 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835. 841 (1982) (citation
omitted).
42 Id. at 841-43.
43 Id. at 842.
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
45 Section 1 provides: "Every contract, combination .... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states. . . . is declared to be illegal." Id. § I (emphasis added).
Section 2 provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize. . . any part
of the trade or commerce among the several states . . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony ...." Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
48 The Supreme Court has most clearly rejected a literal reading of the Sherman Act in
analyzing restraints of trade. The Court has interpreted the statute as invalidating only unreasonable restraints. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Chicago Bd.
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911). See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF Tile LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 63-66, at 165-82
(1977).
47 Id. at 350-52.
48Id. at 344. Brown also maintained that the California program was preempted by the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-674 (1976), and the Commerce Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3. The Court rejected both arguments by finding that the state
program was compatible with the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, and that the regulation did not discriminate against interstate commerce. 317 U.S. at 352-68.
48

317 U.S. at 344.

w The Supreme Court stated: "The declared purpose of the [California Agricultural Prorate
Act, CAL. Acruc. CODE §§ 59641-60015 (West 1968)] is to "conserve the agricultural wealth of the
State' and to 'prevent economic waste in the marketing of agricultural products* of the State."
317 U.S. at 344 (quoting id.).
51 317 U.S. at 346.
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program would violate the Sherman Act if it were made effective
solely by virtue of private conduct. The Court deemed it critical,
however, that the program "derived its authority and its efficacy from

the legislative command of the state and was not intended to operate
or become effective without that command." 52
Because of state sovereignty and principles of federalism, the
Court was reluctant to restrain state action absent a clear congressional intent mandating such restraints. 53 Finding no such
congressional intent, the Court found the California regulatory program to be outside the purview of the Sherman Act. 54 The Court
made clear, however, that there are limitations on the state action

exemption.
[A] state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman
Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their
action is lawful . . .; and we have no question of the state or its
municipality becoming a participant in a private agreement or
combination by others for restraint of trade. 55
Because the State of California engaged in no questionable practices,
the Court found the alleged anticompetitive acts to be legitimate
government action.5
After firmly establishing the state action immunity doctrine5 7 in
Parker,," the Supreme Court unfortunately provided no guidance to
'2 Id. at 350.
Id. at 351.
IId. The Parker Court examined the legislative history of the Sherman Act and concluded
that the Act was not intended to reach state action. Rather, "its purpose was to suppress
combinations to restrain competition and attempts to monopolize by individuals and corporations." Id. See generally Bork, LegEslatice Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. of L. &
Econ. 7 (1966).
" 317 U.S. at 351-52 (citing Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941)- Northern
See. Co. v. United States. 193 U.S. 197. 332, 344-47 (1904)). In Union Pacific Railroad, the
Supreme Court decided that state participation alone in an agreement which violated federal
law did not immunize the agreement from the purview of federal law. 313 U.S. at 464-68.
Similarly in Northern Securities, the Supreme Court decided that by merely granting a corporate
charter to Northern Securities Corporation, the State of New Jersey did not insulate the corporation from the Sherman Act. 193 U.S. at 344-47.
317 U.S. at 352.
'7 The terms exemption and immunity connote the existence of an exception from the scope
of the antitrust laws. This connotation, however, does not apply. In Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 393 n.8 (1978), the Supreme Court stated: "The word
"exemption' is commonly used by courts as a shorthand expression for Parker's holding that the
Sherman Act was not intended by Congress to prohibit the anticompetitive restraints imposed by
[states]." See E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52, 56 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966) ("wedo not reach any question of immunity, since there
was no attempt on the part of Congress to impose liability in the first place").
" Although Parker has been recognized as the case establishing the state action immunity
doctrine, the doctrine actually had its genesis much earlier. See Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332,
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the lower federal courts which considered the scope of the limitations
placed on state action immunity. 59 Thus, the lower courts failed to
establish a consistent standard in applying the doctrine. 60 For the
most part, however, courts viewed the Parker exemption broadly. 1
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,62 the Supreme Court finally

elaborated on the Parker state action exemption. In Goldfarb, the
Virginia State Bar Association enforced a minimum fee schedule
3
which had been published by the Fairfax County Bar Association .
The plaintiff alleged that the program constituted price fixing in

violation of section one of the Sherman Act,6 4 whereas the State and
County Bar Associations claimed that their actions were immune from
antitrust challenge. 5 The Supreme Court held that the anticompetitive activity of the Bar Associations was not the type of state action
which the Sherman Act was intended to immunize.6 6 Relying on
Parker, the Court stressed that for the challenged activity to be exempt, the activity must be "compelled by direction of the State acting
as sovereign." '6 7 Since the State of Virginia did not compel the
344-45 (1904). For an in-depth discussion of the history of the state action doctrine prior to
Parker, see Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine. 76
CoLum. L. REv. 1 (1976).
Subsequent to Parker,the Supreme Court continuously denied certiorari in cases involving
state action immunity. See. e.g., Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972); Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); E.W. Wiggins Airways.
Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966).
60 Compare New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974) (state
and its political subdivisions automatically immune from antitrust liability when state or subdivision is involved in antitrust violative conduct) with Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc.. 444 F.2d 931
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972) (antitrust violative action taken by public
official not automatically shielded from antitrust liability).
01 See, e.g., New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974); Business
Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1972); Gas Light Co. v.
Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972): Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Ele. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971): Ladue Local
Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970). See generally Posner, The
Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the FederalAntitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 693 (1974); Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: a Formulafor Narrowing Parker v.
Brown, 69 Nw.U.L. REv. 71 (1974).
62 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
63 Id. at 776.
Id. at 775-78.
65 Id. at 789-90. The State Bar Association contended that its actions represented state action
because it was "a state agency by law," while the County Bar Association contended that
although it was a voluntary association and not a state agency by law, "the activities of the State
Bar 'prompted' it to issue fee schedules and thus its actions, too [were] state action for Sherman
Act purposes." Id.
6 Id. at 790.
67 Id.
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promulgation or enforcement of the minimum fee schedule, the respective Bar Associations' activities could not be exempt from antitrust
challenge.68
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,69 the Supreme Court indicated
that it would not limit denial of the state action exemption to cases
such as Goldfarb where there was no element of state compulsion.
Cantorinvolved a suit against the Detroit Edison Company by a retail
druggist who alleged that the company's marketing of lightbulbs violated the antitrust laws. 70 In addition to providing electricity to
residents of the State of Michigan, the Detroit Edison Company gratuitously supplied residents with fifty percent of the lightbulbs which
they used.7' The company's rates, which were approved by the
Public Service Commission,7 2 did not reflect any charge for these
lightbulbs. 73 The power company could not discontinue this marketing practice without filing a new tariff with the Commission and
having it approved by the Commission.74 The defendant claimed
that because the tariff was approved by the state, acting through the
Michigan Public Service Commission, the marketing practice was
exempt from the scope of the Sherman Act. 75 The Supreme Court
held that neither the Commission's approval nor the requirement that
any change in the tariff be approved by the Commission constituted
sufficient state compulsion to establish an exemption. 78 Furthermore,
the state regulatory scheme did not evidence a strong state policy in
77
favor of the distribution of lightbulbs.

In Bates v. State Bar,78 the Supreme Court dealt with a challenge
to an Arizona Supreme Court disciplinary rule prohibiting advertising
by attorneys. 79 The plaintiffs claimed that the rule, which was
Id. at 790-92. The necessary compulsion was absent because the Virginia Legislature had
not enacted a statute requiring the publication and enforcement of the minimum fee schedules.
Id. at 790. The legislature simply authorized the Virginia Supreme Court to regulate the legal
profession. The Virginia Supreme Court neither approved nor disapproved of the publication
and enforcement of the minimum fee schedules; their position was neutral.
428 U.S. 579 (1976).
70 Id. at 581. Cantor's complaint asserted that the company's program violated sections one
and two of the Sherman Act. Id. at 581 n.3.
71 Id. at 582.
"
7" The Michigan Public Service Commission has
'complete power and jurisdiction to
regulate all public utilities in the state.' "Id. at 584 (quoting MICH. CoMip. LAWS § 460.6 (1970)).
71 Id. at 582.
71Id. at 585.
I- Id. at 581-82.
76

Id. at 584-85, 593-95.

71 Id. at 584-85.
71 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
70

Id. at 355-56.
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promulgated by the Arizona Supreme Court and enforced by the State

Bar Association, violated sections one and two of the Sherman Act. 80
The Supreme Court held that the disciplinary rule was exempt from
antitrust challenge."'
The Bates Court characterized the challenged restraint as being
"the affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court."8' 2

Be-

cause the Arizona Constitution granted the state supreme court power
over the practice of law, 3 the restraint was " 'compelled by direction
of the State acting as a sovereign.' "84 The Court, however, did not
end its analysis there. Instead, the Court recognized the importance of
other factors when determining the applicability of the state action
doctrine. In distinguishing Cantor, the Court emphasized that Cantor
involved a claim against a private party while Bates involved a claim
against the state. 85 The Bates Court also noted that in Cantor the
State of Michigan had no clear policy concerning the distribution of
lightbulbs whereas in Bates "[t]he disciplinary rules reflect[ed] a clear
articulation of the State's policy with regard to professional behavior." 86 Moreover, the Bates Court recognized that the State of Ar-

izona, unlike Michigan, actively supervised the disciplinary rules.8 7

The Court concluded that these factors effectively immunized the
challenged restraints. 8
After Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, it was apparent that the
Parker exemption would not apply to all state government activities. 9 It was unclear to what extent the Parker immunity would

80Id. at 356.

81 Id. at 363.
82 Id. at 359-60.

See In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 248 P. 29 (1926); Auz. CONST. art. III.
433 U.S. at 359-60 (quoting GoldJarb,421 U.S. at 791). Although Parker, Goldfarb, and
Cantor recognized the need for state legislative action to establish antitrust immunity, see supra
notes 50, 68 & 72 and accompanying text, Bates clearly established that state legislative action
was not the sine qua non to granting antitrust immunity. The Bates Court held that through the
promulgation of rules the Arizona Supreme Court could establish a state policy sufficient to grant
antitrust immunity. 433 U.S. at 360.
" 433 U.S. at 361. The Bates Court offered no reasons why "Cantor would have been an
entirely different case if the claim had been directed against a public official or public agency,
rather than against a private party." Id. But see Rogers, Municipal Antitrust Liability in a
FederalistSystem, 1980 Arz. ST. L.J. 305, 309-10.
88 433 U.S. at 362.
87 Id. The Court deemed it important that "the rules [were] subject to pointed re-examination by the... Arizona Supreme Court in enforcement proceedings." Id.
" Id. at 362-63.
88 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist.,
557 F.2d 580, 589 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 992, reinstated, 583 F.2d
378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979), stated: "Cantor and Goldfarb demonstrate beyond serious questioning that the Supreme Court is not inclined any longer, if it ever
83

4
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apply to a municipality's anticompetitive activity.90

845
The Supreme

Court attempted to outline the scope of the Parker immunity with
respect to municipalities in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &

Light Co. 91
In Lafayette, two Louisiana cities filed suit alleging that the
Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Louisiana Power) committed various
antitrust offenses which injured the cities in the operation of their
electric utility systems.92 Louisiana Power counterclaimed, alleging
that the cities also committed antitrust offenses. 3 The cities moved to
dismiss the counterclaim, claiming that Parker immunized their
actions. 94 The Supreme Court rejected this theory on two alternative
grounds. First, a majority of the Court rejected the cities' contention
that Congress intended to exclude municipalities from the scope of the
Sherman Act. 5 The Court observed that there is a presumption
against implied exclusions96 and that courts will not find an exclusion
unless there are weighty countervailing policies present to overcome

was, to accept superficial and mechanical application of a Parker-based'rule' that antitrust
inquiry ends upon such a finding of governmental actions or laws being involved."
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb, and continuing after Cantor and
Bates, lower federal courts tended to view the exemption narrowly. See, e.g., City of Fairfax v.
Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1977), vacated, 435 U.S. 992 (1978); Kurek v.
Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S.
992 (1978), reinstated,583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Duke &
Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3rd Cir. 1975).
Although the Court had not yet considered the scope of Parkerimmunity with regard to
municipalities, the lower federal courts had done so. In Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th
Cir. 1977), vacated sub nom. City of Impact v. Whitworth, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated: "[W]here the governmental unit concerned is other than a
state itself, such as the municipality here, a more thorough analysis is required before Parker can
be held to apply." Id. at 381. The court refused to equate the municipality's action with the
state's action. The court stated: "A subordinate state governmental body is not ipso facto exempt
from the operation of the antitrust laws." Id. (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 435 U.S. 389 (1978)). Thus, the court noted that
immunity could only attach after the court applied the traditional state action immunity test.
Id., accord Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975). See generally Note, The
Antitrust Liability of Municipalities Under the Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U.L. REv. 368 (1977);
Note, Antitrust Law and MunicipalCorporations:Are MunicipalitiesExempt from Sherman Act
Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 Gao. L.J. 1547 (1977).
-' 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
92 Id. at 391-92. The complaint alleged that Louisiana Power violated sections one and two
of the Sherman Act in order to retain sole control over the electric bulk power in the area. Id. at
392 n.5.
"' Id. at 392. The counterclaim alleged that the cities violated section one of the Sherman Act
in order to displace Louisiana Power in certain areas. Id. at 392 n.6.
IId. at 392.
ld. at 398-408.
I'
Id. at 399. See generally United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (antitrust
laws are critical to functioning of free enterprise system).
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the presumption. 9 7 The Lafayette Court rejected the policy arguments which the cities advanced in seeking to establish an implied
exemption.9 8

Having rejected the cities' first argument, the Lafayette Court
next considered whether the Parker exemption should apply with
equal force to a state's political subdivisions. A plurality of the Court9"
held that a municipality's status as such did not automatically make
available the Parker exemption. 0 0 Nevertheless, the Lafayette plurality noted that a municipality's anticompetitive activities could be
11 435 U.S. at 400. The Supreme Court has only recognized two policy-based implied
exclusions. In Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961), the Court held that the Sherman Act was not intended to "prohibit two or more persons
from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take
particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint of a monopoly." Id. at
136. The Court stated, however, that efforts to influence government action which were a "mere
sham" were subject to the antitrust laws. Id. at 144. The Noerr Court reasoned that one's right to
"make [his] wishes known to [his] representatives," and one's right to petition the government
would be infringed if no exemption were found. Id. at 137-38. See also California Motor Transp.
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (destructive of rights of association and of
petition to use antitrust laws to prevent groups from using state and federal agencies and courts
to promote their causes vis-a-vis their competitors); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657, 670 (1965) ("[j]oint efforts to influence public officials do not violate.., antitrust laws
even though intended to eliminate competition").
A second policy-based exclusion was put forth in Parkerv. Brown. In Parker, the Supreme
Court held that state sovereignty and principles of federalism were sufficient countervailing
policies to preclude application of the Sherman Act. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 400 (construing
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
9s435 U.S. at 400-08. Initially, the Lafayette Court rejected the cities' contention that "it
would be anomalous to subject municipalities to the criminal and civil liabilities imposed upon
violators of the antitrust laws," noting that cities have had to comply with other federal laws
which impose sanctions on "persons." Id. at 400; see, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (Civil Rights Act); Union Pac. Ry, v. United States, 313 U.S. 450
(1941) (Elkins Act).
The Court next rejected the cities' contention "that the antitrust laws are intended to protect
the public only from abuses of private power and not from actions of municipalities." 435 U.S. at
403. The Court maintained that many times municipalities act to benefit their citizens at the
expense of non-citizens. Such acts can have just as disruptive an effect on the national economy
as acts done by a private party in furtherance of his interests. Id. at 405. Therefore, in reality
there was no "public service" policy sufficient to create an implied exemption from the antitrust
laws.
0 Chief Justice Burger joined in part I of the Court's opinion but failed to join in part II. The
Chief Justice agreed with the plurality's position that a municipality's status as such did not
automatically make available the Parker exemption; however, he focused on the proprietary
nature of the cities' action in refusing to apply Parker.See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
100Id. at 408. The Lafayette plurality noted that municipalities are not afforded identical
protections and considerations as the state itself. Id. at 412. The plurality stated: "Cities are not
themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal deference of the states that create them."
Id.; cf. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (eleventh amendment does not operate to
prevent counties from being sued in federal court). But cf. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S.
474 (1968) (actions of local government are actions of state for purposes of fourteenth amend-

ment).
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immune from antitrust challenges.' 0 ' The plurality stated: "[T]he
Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as
an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions,
pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or
monopoly public service."10 2 Thus, to qualify for immunity a municipality must show that the state "authorized or directed a. . . municipality to act as it did. . . [and] that 'the legislature contemplated the
kind of action complained of.' "103 The Lafayette plurality made
clear, however, that "[tihis does not mean ... that a political subdivision necessarily must be able to point to a specific, detailed legisla-

tive authorization before it properly may assert a Parker defense to an
antitrust suit." 104
In CaliforniaRetail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 0 5 the Supreme Court adopted a uniform state action

immunity test.106 Midcal Aluminum Company, a wholesale distributor of wine, sought to enjoin enforcement of California's wine pricing
program 0 7 on the grounds that it violated the Sherman Act. 0 8 Although the Supreme Court recognized that the program violated the
201

435 U.S. at 413.

102 Id.

103Id. at 414-15 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431,
434 (5th Cir. 1976), a'ffd, 435 U.S. 389 (1979)); see Community Builders, Inc. v. City of
Phoenix, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981) (Arizona statute evidences specific declaration of anticompetitive policy); Cedar-Riverside Assocs. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Minn. 1978),
ajf'd on other grounds sub nom. Cedar-Riverside Assocs. v. City of Minneapolis, 606 F.2d 254
(8th Cir. 1979) (statutory scheme as whole evidences intent by legislature to permit municipalities to engage in anticompetitive activity).
204 435 U.S. at 415. In not requiring unequivocal authorization, the Lafayette plurality made
Parkerimmunity for political subdivisions of the state dependent upon judicial interpretation of
what constitutes a proper legislative mandate. To determine if a proper legislative mandate is
present, a court must review "all evidence which might show the scope of legislative intent."
Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Servs., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543, 554 (M.D.N.C. 1979)
(quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1976),
aff'd, 435 U.S. 389 (1979)); see United States v. Texas State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 592 F.2d
919 (5th Cir.) (Cee, J., dissenting) (construing Lafayette, 532 F.2d at 434) (connection between
grant and use of power cannot be too tenuous to permit conclusion that legislature intended
anticompetitive regulation), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 925 (1979).
105445 U.S. 97 (1980).
10 Although the Supreme Court formulated a uniform test, courts stressed different factors
when applying the test to private parties and subdivisions of the state. See United States v. Title
Ins. Rating Bureau, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1053, 1058-59 (D. Ariz. 1981); Highfield Water Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 488 F. Supp. 1176, 1186-91 (D. Md. 1980). See generally Lafayette, 435
U.S. at 410 n.40.
207 The wine pricing program required that all wine producers, wholesalers, and rectifiers file
fair trade contracts or price schedules with the state. 445 U.S. at 99 (citing CAL. Bus. & PRo.
CODE ANN. § 24866 (West 1964)). The program also required state licensed wine merchants to
sell wine to retailers at the price set" 'either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair
trade contract.' " Id. (quoting CAL. Bus. & PnoF. CODE ANN. § 24866 (West Supp. 1980)),
208 Id. at 100.
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Sherman Act, it maintained that the program could survive if it were
09 Incorporating the holdshielded from the Sherman Act by Parker.1
ings and rationales of Parker, Goldfarb, Cantor,Bates and Lafayette,
the Court put forth the proper test for Parker immunity. "First, the
challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy'; 1t0 second, the policy must be 'actively supervised"" by the State itself."" 2 The Midcal Court observed that the
California program was established pursuant to a clear legislative
policy."

3

Because it was not actively supervised by the state,"

4

how-

challenge." 5

ever, it was not exempt from antitrust
In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,'" the
Supreme Court considered whether a home rule" 7 municipality's
actions were exempt from antitrust challenge." 8 City of Boulder, a
home rule municipality, advanced two arguments in attempting to
insulate its acts from antitrust scrutiny. Boulder maintained that

101Id. at 103.
110 See Community Builders, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 652 F.2d 823, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1981);

United States v. Title Ins. Rating Bureau, 517 F. Supp. 1053, 1059 (D. Ariz. 1981); Serlin Wine
& Spirit Merchants, Inc. v. Healy, 512 F. Supp. 936, 942 (D. Conn. 1981); Health Care
Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Medical Soc'y, 501 F. Supp. 970, 993 (S.D. Iowa 1980); Mason
City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 742 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
"' See Serlin Wine & Spirit Merchants, Inc. v. Healy, 512 F. Supp. 936, 942 (D. Conn. 1981);
Guthrie v. Genesee County, 494 F. Supp. 950, 955-56 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Bechenstein v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., 479 F. Supp. 417, 421 (D. Conn. 1979).
1I2 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410).
113

"I

Id.
Id. The Court stated:

The State simply authorized price-setting and enforces the prices established by
private parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the reasonableness of
the price schedules; nor does it regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State
does not monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointed re-examination" of the
program.
Id. at 105-06 (footnote omitted).
115 Id.
118 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
117 Municipal home rule refers to the "power of local self government." 1 E. McQUILtuN, THE
LAW or MUNICIPAL COPOaA11ONS § 141, at 51 (3d ed. 1971). This power is vested in cities and
towns by a charter granted to the municipality pursuant to constitutional or statutory provisions.
Id.; see, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (people of cities with population of two thousand vested
with power to choose home rule authority); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:69A.29-30 (West 1967)
(municipalities have full power to organize and regulate external affairs). The purpose of a home
rule charter is to grant a municipality freedom to manage its local affairs without state interference. 2 E. McQuiLIN, supra, § 9.08, at 634. See generally Klemme, The Powers of Home Rule
Cities in Colorado, 36 U. COLO. L. REv. 321 (1964); Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power
Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643 (1964); Vanlandingham,
Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. RE. 269 (1968).
118102 S. Ct. at 836-44.

1982]

NOTES

849

when dealing with purely local matters," 9 its status as a home rule
municipality made it the equivalent of the state itself for Parker
immunity purposes.120 Accordingly, Boulder emphasized that for the
Parker exemption to apply, it need only show that the alleged anticompetitive practices were part of a clearly articulated,
affirmatively
2
expressed, and actively supervised city policy. 1
Justice Brennan rejected this argument because "it both misstates
the letter of the law and misunderstands its spirit." 2 2 The Boulder
Court deemed it inapposite that Boulder was a home rule municipality with extensive powers in local affairs. Instead, the Court emphasized that the Parker exemption was premised on "the federalism
principle that we are a nation of States, a principle that makes no
accommodation for sovereign subdivisions of States."'' 23 The Court,
relying on the plurality opinion in Lafayette, reiterated that municipalities " 'are not themselves sovereign,' " 124 rather, they derive their
authority from the state and are subordinate to the state. 2 5

After dismissing Boulder's state equivalency argument, the Court
considered Boulder's second argument. Boulder maintained that the
alleged anticompetitive actions were undertaken pursuant to a clearly
articulated policy as affirmatively expressed by the Colorado home

11

The Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that Boulder's regulation of cable television was a local matter, and thus "within the scope of the power delegated to the City of Boulder
by virtue of the Colorado Home Rule Amendment." Id. at 841 n.16. See supra note 28.
120 102 S. Ct. at 841. Boulder relied on the expansive language of the home rule amendment of
the Colorado Constitution. See supra note 17. Boulder maintained that a home rule municipality
possessed "every power theretofore possessed by the legislature . . . in local and municipal
affairs." 102 S. Ct. at 841 (quoting Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, Colo. -,
-,
618 P.2d 1374, 1381 (1980) (quoting Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 149 Colo. 284, 294, 269 P.2d 67, 72 (1962)). Therefore, the acts of
Boulder were in reality the acts of the legislature. See 102 S. Ct. at 841 n.17; Brief for
Respondent, .supranote 17, at 20-22. See generally Klemme, supra note 117, at 359 (Colorado
Constitution provides one of broadest grants of home rule power).
1-" 102 S. Ct. at 841.
122 Id. at 842.
'23 Id. at 840. The Boulder Court wholeheartedly accepted the federalism rationale used by
Judge Markey in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.
1980) (Markey, J., dissenting), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982). Judge Markey
maintained that the Parkerexemption was intended to apply to states as states, thus, the "state
sovereignty approach . . . is inapplicable here." Id. at 717; see Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs,
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025, 1032 (N.D. Tex. 1978) ("However 'sovereign' home rule cities ... may
be, they nonetheless carr- the status of municipalities so far as federalism is concerned"); see also
City of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958) (home rule cities can only be arm or
branch of state). But see Pueblo Aircraft Serv., Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 498 F. Supp. 1205, 1210
(D. Colo), appealpending, No. 80-2083 (10th Cir., Oct. 16, 1980) ("municipal policy exercised
by a home rule city in Colorado is the equivalent of 'state action' when exercised in connection
with municipal affairs").
t 102 S. Ct. at 842 (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412).
Id. (citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886)).
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rule amendment's "guarantee of local autonomy."'' 6 Moreover,
Boulder maintained that it could be inferred from the broad power
granted to the city by the home rule amendment that the 2State
of
7

Colorado "contemplated the kind of action complained of."

The Boulder Court, however, rejected this theory. Although the
Court recognized that a state may sanction anticompetitive municipal
activities and thereby immunize municipalities from antitrust liability, 12 8 it reasoned that Boulder's actions were not a proper subject for
immunization. The Court held that Boulder's activities were not undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated, affirmatively expressed
state policy. 2 9 Rather, the actions were undertaken pursuant to a
state policy of "precise neutrality."' 13 Justice Brennan stated: "A
State that allows its municipalities to do as they please can hardly be
said to have 'contemplated' the specific anticompetitive actions for
which municipal liability is sought." ' 3 The Boulder Court refused to
accept the proposition "that a general grant of power to enact ordinances necessarily implies state authorization to enact specific anti-

competitive ordinances."132 Such a theory "would wholly eviscerate
the concepts of 'clear articulation and affirmative expression' " which

133
are essential for the Parkerexemption to apply.

128 Id.
121

Id. Boulder asserted that a locally autonomous government does not need "to point to a

specific detailed legislative authorization" to establish a clearly articulated and affirmativel%'
expressed state policy. Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 26. Rather, a guarantee of local
authority and a broad grant of power to effectuate that guarantee imply that the state contemplated and approved the actions taken by home rule municipalities. See id.
18 102 S. Ct. at 842.
'1' Id. at 843. Because there was no clearly articulated, affirmatively expressed state policy.
the Boulder Court advanced no opinion on whether a municipality "must or could satisfy the
'active state supervision' test" essential for Parkerimmunity to apply. Id. at 841 n. 14.
130 Id.
131 Id.

at 843.

131 Id. The Boulder Court is not alone in this respect. E.g., Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of
Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1981); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 474 F.
Supp. 1072 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex.
1978).
1" 102 S. Ct. at 843. The Boulder Court reasoned that any "clear articulation and affirmative
expression" must be evidenced by a uniform statewide policy to replace competition with
regulation. Justice Brennan determined that if each home rule municipality were able to
establish a different antitrust policy, the "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" test
would no longer be viable. In Glenwillow Landfill v. City of Akron, 485 F. Supp. 671. 678
(N.D. Ohio 1979), a f'd sub nom. Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir.
1981), vacated, 50 U.S.L.W. 3667 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1982) (No. 81-723), the district court of Ohio
noted that "clear articulation and affirmative expression" need not necessarily reflect a uniform
state policy. A court must examine whether there is a "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed" intent on the part of the state to have diversity instead of homogeneity. See id.The
Supreme Court, however, has clearly rejected this rationale by its decision in Boulder. See
Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 50 U.S.L.W. 3667 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1982) (No. 81-723); see
also Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 843.
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The majority opinion rejected the city's assertion that a denial of
the Parker exemption "will have serious adverse consequences for
cities, and will unduly burden the federal courts."'' 34 Instead, the
Court decided that the "policy of free markets and open competition
embodied in the antitrust laws" outweighed any adverse consequences
or burdens resulting from enforcement of the antitrust laws against
municipalities. 1 5 As a result, a municipality will still be able to
provide services on a monopoly basis provided the anticompetitive
activities are undertaken pursuant to a clear state policy.' 38 Accordingly, Justice Brennan concluded: " '[A]ssuming that the municipality
is authorized to provide service on a monopoly basis, these limitations
on municipal action will not hobble the execution of legitimate governmental programs.'" 137
Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion 3 8 maintaining that
the majority's analysis was flawed in two respects. 39 First, he
claimed that the Boulder majority erroneously concentrated on
40
It
whether municipalities were "exempt" from the Sherman Act.
was his contention that the true issue before the Boulder Court was
whether statutes, ordinances, and regulations are preempted by the
Act.

14 1

Focusing on the differences inherent in preemption and exemption analysis, 42 the dissent observed that preemption analysis involves
124

'"

102 S. Ct. at 843.
See id. Because of the preliminary posture of the case, the Court did not consider the

adverse consequences and burdens resulting from enforcement of the antitrust laws against
municipalities. Id. at 843 n.20. Nevertheless, the Boulder Court noted that substantive antitrust
law may differ depending upon the identity of the defendant. See id. See generally I P. AiEEA &
D. TuRNus, ANTmusT LAW
317a(1), at 102-03 (1978) (equitable antitrust remedy only for
antitrust violations by state and state subdivisions); Klitzke, Antitrust Liability of Municipal
Corporations:The Per Se Rule vs. The Rule of Reason-A Reasonable Compromise, 1980 Amiz.
ST. L.J. 253 (unique nature of municipal corporations precludes identical treatment for private
parties and municipal corporations); Note, FederalAntitrust Immunity: Exposure of Municipalities to Treble Antitrust Damages Sets Limit for New Federalism: City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 11 CONN. L. REV. 126 (1978) (alternatives to exposing municipalities to
federal antitrust laws).
136102 S. Ct. at 843-44 (construing Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 416-17).
I" Id. at 844 (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 417).
M Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor joined in Justice Rehnquist's dissent.
'
102 S. Ct. at 845 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
340 Id. Justice Rehnquist maintained that the ParkerCourt did not even consider the exemption issue. Rather, he claimed that the ParkerCourt held that the Sherman Act did not preempt
all state and local anticompetitive regulations. Id. at 845 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra
notes 47-56 and accompanying text & infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
14t 102 S. Ct. at 845 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Preemption is the remedy used by courts to
Invalidate state statutes that irreconcilably conflict with federal statutes or that intrude upon a
field exclusively occupied by the federal government. See id. at 845-56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); injra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
1' 102 S. Ct. at 845-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally Handler, Antitrust-1978,
78 COLvM. L. Rav. 1363 (1978).
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the reconciliation of state and federal statutes while exemption analy43
sis involves the interplay between enactments of a single sovereign.1

Justice Rehnquist stated that because the "state action" doctrine involves the interplay of state and local regulations with federal antitrust statutes, "questions concerning the 'state action' doctrine are
more properly framed as being ones of preemption rather than exemption. '" 44 Relying expressly on Parker, Justice Rehnquist stated that
the Parker Court held "that state regulation of the economy is not
necessarily preempted by the antitrust laws."'' 45 Nevertheless, the

dissent continued, the ParkerCourt held that "some state regulation is

46
preempted by the Sherman Act."
As further support for this proposition, the dissent noted that two
recently decided Supreme Court cases treated the "state action" doctrine as a "matter of federal preemption." 47 Justice Rehnquist main-

tained that in New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,

48

the

Supreme Court held that a motor vehicle dealership franchising regu-

latory act "was outside the purview of the Sherman Act."'14 Similarly, Justice Rehnquist maintained that in Midcal the Supreme Court

held that a state regulated wine pricing system was preempted by the
Sherman Act.150
The dissent observed that the Parker, New Motor Vehicle, and
Midcal Courts merely decided that state legislation not saved by the
Parker doctrine was invalid and unenforceable because it was pre-

141 102 S. Ct. at 845-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent observed that preemption
analysis invariably involves the "sensitive area of federal-state relations," thus preemption is not
readily inferred. Id. at 846 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In contrast, however, exemption analysis
involves "no problems of federalism." Id. Accordingly, exemptions from the purview of federal
law are not readily found. See id. Implied exclusions have also been recognized if enforcement of
the antitrust laws would be repugnant to a federal regulatory scheme applicable to the antitrust
violative activity. See Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659. 682 (1975); United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 394 U.S. 321, 350-51 & nn. 28-29 (1963).
114 102 S. Ct. at 846 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
145Id. at 847 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist indicated that much of the
language used in Parker was "clearly the language of federal preemption." Id. (construing
Parker,317 U.S. at 350-51). Justice Rehnquist noted that the Parker Court concentrated on the
Sherman Act's "occupation of the legislative field" and its effect on state sovereignty. Id. at 846
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This signified to Justice Rehnquist that the Parker Court utilized a
preemption analysis in holding some anticompetitive activities to be outside the purview of the
antitrust laws. See id.
146 Id. at 847 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
147 Id.
148 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
4, 102 S. Ct. at 847 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In New Motor Vehicle, a state statute was

allowed to stand even though it purportedly conflicted with the Sherman Act. Id. The dissent
noted that this regulation was not preempted because it met the "state action" immunity test. Id.
,50See id.
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Z50

empted by the Sherman Act.' 5 ' By contrast, however, the dissent
indicated that the majority opinion suggests that a municipality may
legislation not
violate the Sherman Act for enacting anticompetitive
52

pursuant to an affirmatively expressed state policy.
Justice Rehnquist maintained that the majority's exemption analysis would lead to many problems. 53 Justice Rehnquist questioned
whether "per se" rules of illegality would apply to municipalities and

private parties alike and whether municipalities which violated the
antitrust laws would be liable for treble damages. 5 4 Moreover, the
dissent maintained that the most troubling problem would be the
proper application of the rule of reason to municipal anticompetitive
actions. 155
151Id.

15IId. at 847-48 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting). Justice Stevens, who joined the majority opinion,
strongly disagreed with the dissent's assertion. See id. at 844 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens stated that in antitrust exemption cases "the violation issue is separate and distinct from
the exemption issue." Id. Stevens observed that in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), the plurality decided that the state action exemption was not available
to the cities' actions. This decision, however, was not tantamount to a decision that the antitrust
laws were violated. 102 S. Ct. at 844 (Stevens, J.,concurring). Compare Air Freight Hualage
Co. v. Ryd-Air, 408 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (defendant's motion for summary judgment
on immunity from antitrust laws denied) with Air Freight Hualage Co. v. Ryd-Air, Inc., 1978-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,321 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), af'd, 603 F.2d 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 864 (1979) (no antitrust violations found during trial on merits).
Justice Stevens also emphasized "the obvious difference between a charge that public
officials have violated the Sherman Act and a charge that private parties have done so." 102 S.
Ct. at 844 (Stevens, J., concurring); see id. at 844 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring). See supra note
85.
"' '102 S.Ct. at 848 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. The dissent asserted that under the majority's current test, municipalities would
I
inevitably be held liable for treble damages. See id. at 848 n.2 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting). See
generally Note, Antitrust Treble Damages as Applied to Local Government Entities: Does the
Punishment Fit the Defendant?, 1980 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 411 (inappropriateness of holding municipalities liable for treble damages); Note, The Erosion of State Action Immunity From the
Antitrust Laws: City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 45 BaOOKLYN L. Rlv. 165,
187-88 (1978) (problems inherent in imposition of treble damages to municipalities); Note, supra
note 135, at 139-46 (effects of treble damages on municipalities; alternatives to treble damages).
135102 S. Ct. at 848 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Chicago Bd.of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918), Justice Brandeis formulated the classic statement of the rule of reason. He
stated:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to
restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the
nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint,
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
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The dissent observed that in National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States, 56 the Court held that anticompetitive
restraints can only be defended if they are reasonable in their effect on
competition or if they ultimately promote competition.157 Because
municipal ordinances are enacted to further the best interests of the

community in a non-economic way,

58 the

dissent claimed that such

ordinances would not survive antitrust scrutiny.1, 9 Thus, such an
application of the rule of reason would destroy a municipality's power
60
to regulate the economy. 1
The dissent viewed as equally troublesome the application of

a "modified" rule of reason standard to accommodate municipalities. '6 Such a "modified" rule of reason would permit "a municipality to defend its regulation on the basis that its benefits to the community outweigh its anticompetitive effects."' 61 2 Justice Rehnquist
indicated that such an approach would lead to an "essentially standardless inquiry into the reasonableness of local regulation." 6 3 This
would allow courts to use the Sherman Act's ban on anticompetitive
activity as an expedient to invalidate "unwise" legislation.1 61
According to Justice Rehnquist, these problems could be avoided
by using a preemption rather than an exemption analysis. 65 Municipalities would not be liable for treble damages when enacting anticompetitive ordinances since these ordinances would be preempted by

knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id.
For a discussion of the rule of reason, see L. SULUVAN, supra note 46, §§ 63-66, at 165-82,
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division. 74 YALE
L.J. 775 (1965).
]- 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
Is" 102 S. Ct. at 848 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (construing National Soc'y of Professional
Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)).
158 Id.
"5' See id. at 848-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
lao Id. at 848 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the effect of Boulder is that
"[tjhis country's municipalities will be unable to experiment with innovative social programs."
Id. at 849 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally Rose, MunicipalActivities and the Antitrust
Laws After City of Lafayette, 57 U. DEr. J. URB. L. 483 (1980).
181 102 S. Ct. at 849 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
162 Id.
103 Id. The dissent compared this approach to that used by courts reviewing social legislation.
Id. During the Lochner era, "liberty of contract" and "substantive due process" were the
standards used to judge the reasonableness of local regulation. See id. The dissent maintained
that if the "modified" rule of reason were adopted, "the procompetitive principles of the
Sherman Act will be the governing standard by which the reasonableness of all local regulation
will be determined." Id.
164 Id.
15

Id.
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the Sherman Act, and preempted legislation is simply invalid and
unenforceable.166 Furthermore, courts would not have to engage in a
"standardless review" of the reasonableness of local ordinances since
courts would simply apply the Midcal criteria to determine if an
ordinance is preempted.16 7 Thus, an ordinance which is enacted
pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed city policy to displace competition with regulation and is actively supervised
by the city would survive the preemptive effect of the Sherman Act.6 8
The preemption analysis advocated by Justice Rehnquist illustrates the dissent's second major problem with the majority's opinion.
The dissent maintained that the majority failed to recognize the federalism principles involved when municipal ordinances are invalidated. 6 9 Because such principles are involved, the dissent stated that
municipal ordinances should not be "more susceptible to invalidation
under the Sherman Act than are state statutes."170 In his preemption
analysis, Justice Rehnquist recognized this fact by noting that "[the
preemption analysis] should apply in challenges to municipal regulation in similar fashion as it applies in a challenge to a state regulatory

enactment." 171

Justice Rehnquist warned that the majority's holding "will radically alter the relationship between States and their political subdivisions." 172 In addition to thwarting a municipality's ability to regulate
the local economy, the dissent claimed that the majority's opinion will
force home rule municipalities "to cede its authority back to the

Id. & n.4.
1,7Id. at 849.
I" Id. The preemption test offered by the dissent permits a municipality to authorize anticompetitive activity without any state policy mandating the anticompetitive activity or any state
supervision. See infra note 170.
10 102 S. Ct. at 850 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that courts treat state and
municipal enactments identically "with regard to the preemptive effects of federal law." Id.; see
e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
170102 S. Ct. at 850 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). By permitting municipalities to determine
when to replace competition with regulation, the dissent maintained that municipalities would
receive the deference mandated by federalism which had previously been afforded states and
municipalities alike when courts have examined whether state and local regulations had been
preempted. See id. See also supra note 143.
1 102 S. Ct. at 850 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 850-51 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, noted
I7
that the majority merely held that the City of Boulder was not entitled to an antitrust exemption.
Id. at 844 (Stevens, J., concurring). He stated that since the Boulder Court made no finding
concerning whether the antitrust laws had been violated, "[t]he dissent's dire predictions about
the consequences of the Court's holding should therefore be viewed with skepticism." Id. at 844
(Stevens, J., concurring).
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1 73
The dissent conStates" in order to prevent antitrust challenges.
74
unsound.
was
holding
a
such
cluded that
The Supreme Court's holding in Boulder is simply the logical

progression of the Court's state action doctrine holdings. By rejecting
Boulder's arguments, the Court demonstrated the limited availability
of the state action doctrine for municipal actions. The Court's paramount concern was ensuring that only "true state action" is immune
75
from antitrust scrutiny.1

In Midcal, the Supreme Court outlined the elements of true state
action. The Midcal Court held that true state action was present only
when the state had clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a
policy to displace competition with regulation1 7 and had actively
173Id. at 851 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that home rule municipalities will
be defenseless to antitrust challenges to its regulation of the local economy since the state is
totally unable to authorize the challenged conduct. Id. Thus, the home rule municipality will be
forced to alter its status so that it will not be precluded from regulating the local economy. Id.
7 Id. The dissent stated:
It is unfortunate enough that the Court today holds that our federalism is not
implicated when municipal legislation is invalidated by a federal statute. It is
nothing less than a novel and egregious error when this Court uses the Sherman Act
to regulate the relationship between the states and their political subdivisions.
Id.
175In Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated sub nora. City of Impact
v. Whitworth, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized the
importance of the Court's concern. The circuit court observed that -[a] thoughtful analysis is
called for to ensure that it is a bona fide governmental decision for which exemption is being
sought." Id. at 381.
'78 See e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 445 U.S. 97
(1980); see also Cantor, 428 U.S. at 590-91. Although the Midcal Court observed that clear
articulation was a necessary element of true state action, it failed to specify the exact components
of clear articulation. Nevertheless, these components are evident when cases interpreting the true
state action doctrine are examined.
Initially, there must be a valid state regulatory interest present before a state can clearly
articulate a policy displacing competition with regulation. Mobilfone v. Commonwealth Tel.
Co., 571 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 1978); Guthrie v. Genesee County, 494 F. Supp. 950, 956
(W.D.N.Y. 1980); see Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410; Cantor, 428 U.S. at 584-85. Were it not for
the requirement of a valid regulatory interest, a state would always be able to circumvent the
Sherman Act's policy in favor of competition by clearly articulating an anticompetitive activity
and actively supervising the anticompetitive activity. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 351-52. A state
statute enacted without a valid regulatory interest will be automatically invalidated. If a court
finds that the state has a valid regulatory interest, the court will next examine the language
which the defendant relied upon when engaging in the challenged activity to see if the state had
in fact clearly articulated an anticompetitive policy.
Although the Lafayette plurality stated that one seeking to establish the existence of a
clearly articulated policy need not "'be able to point to a specific detailed legislative authorization, " 435 U.S. at 415, Courts have been reluctant to infer such a policy in the absence of a clear
declaration showing a legislative authorization of anticompetitive activity. See, e.g.. Community Builders, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 652 F.2d 823, 329 (9th Cir. 1981); Mason City Center
Assocs. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 742-43 (N.D. Iowa 1979); Woolen v. Surtran
Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025, 1031-32 (N.D. Tex. 1978). But see Cedar-Riverside Assocs. v.
United States, 459 F. Supp. 1290, 1298 (D. Minn. 1978), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. CedarRiverside Assocs. v. City of Minneapolis, 606 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1979) (although anticompetitive
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60"t

that policy.1 78 The unanimous decision of the Midcal

Court signified the strength of the true state action doctrine. Nevertheless, due to a fundamental disagreement concerning the essence of
the doctrine, the Boulder majority and dissent arrived at opposite

conclusions while employing identical tests. The dissent maintained
that the majority's failure to appreciate the preemption principles
inherent in true state action analysis was unsound. 79 It is the dissent,
however, which failed to appreciate the interaction between preemption principles and true state action.
The preemption doctrine is based on the principle of supremacy

of federal law over state law.

80

Thus, state law that is incompatible

with federal law will be invalidated.' 8" Incompatibility arises in two
activity is not specifically mentioned, statutory scheme as whole permits court to infer clearly
articulated policy to replace competition with regulation). See generally 1 P. AREEDA & D.
TufnNn, supra note 135. 1 214, at 80-92.
'" Mere approval or acquiescence of a regulator , program is insufficient to constitute active
supervision. Rather, a certain degree of affirmative supervisory action by the state is required to
constitute active supervision. See Midcal. 445 U.S. at 105-06. Compare Schwegmann Bros. v.
Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 386-87 (1951) (Louisiana statute leaving both initiation
and enforcement of fair trade pricing contracts to discretion of private parties does not constitute
active supervision) and Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502, 509-10 (4th Cir.
1959) (state statute requiring Boards of Trade to promulgate "just and reasonable" regulations
does not constitute adequate supervision) with Bates, 433 U.S. at 359-62 (Arizona Supreme
Court's promulgation, enforcement, and reexamination of alleged anticompetitive disciplinary
rules constitutes active supervision) and Parker, 317 U.S. at 352 (decisions by state regarding
adoption, enforcement, and application of alleged anticompetitive program constitutes active
supervision). See generally 1 P. AErA & D. Tuw,4Ea, supra note 135, 213, at 71-79: Posner,
supra note 61, at 721-24.
"1h445 U.S. at 105. In antitrust analysis "true state action" is a concept separate and distinct
from the traditional concept of state action. Traditional state action has most often been
analyzed in the context of the fourteenth amendment. Courts have focused on the degree of state
involvement in the practice challenged as violating the fourteenth amendment to determine if
state action is present. See. e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis. 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Traditional antitrust state action merely refers to statutes and regulations affecting competition.
See. e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.
v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966). See generally Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust:
Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. Rev. 328, 330 & n.14 (1975).
'7 See 102 S. Ct. at 851 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
This principle has its roots in the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, U.S.
CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2, which provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Id.
RA See generally L. TmBE,AMERICAN CoNsTU-oNAL LAW §§ 6-24 to 6-25, at 376-91 (1978);
Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and The Burger Court, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Preemption Doctrine]; Note, A
Frameworkfor Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Preemption Analysis].
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instances. First, federal law may be such that any parallel state legis-

lation is inherently in conflict with federal law.

82

Inherent conflict is

present when Congress has expressed a clear and manifest purpose to
occupy the field; I'3 either the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive that the inference of occupation is created; 81 4 or the nature of the
subject matter mandates uniformity. 185 Second, incompatibility
arises when federal and state statutes irreconcilably conflict. 88 Such
conflict occurs when the "challenged state statute 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and

objectives of Congress.'

"1187

Because federal and state antitrust laws are not in inherent con-

flict, federal law has not been viewed as supplanting state power to
enact antitrust legislation.188 All state antitrust legislation, however,
does not necessarily promote competition. Therefore, when a state
enacts legislation having anticompetitive effects, courts must determine whether the state legislation irreconcilably conflicts with federal
antitrust legislation. If so, the state legislation is preempted. 189 In
applying the preemption test, a court must first determine the national objective behind the federal statute. Having done this, a court

"'

See Note, The Preemption Doctrine. supra note 181, at 624-25.
183 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers.
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-46 (1963); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 301 (1961), Welch
Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 85 (1939).
184New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413-15 (1973); City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
185 For example, the Supreme Court has recognized that labor policy demands uniformity.
thus, federal labor laws are exclusive. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 244-45 (1959); Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315
U.S. 740, 740-51 (1941). See generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REv.
1337 (1972).
118See Note, The Preemption Doctrine, supra note 181, at 626.
167 Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941)); e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663
(1962). For cases in which the Court found no irreconcilable conflict, see, e.g., Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
I" E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:9-1 to :9-19 (West Cum. Supp. 1981); see, e.g., Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice. Co., 336 U.S. 490, 495 (1948); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 394 (1940);
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 97-98 (1908); see I P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra
note 135, 208, at 58; see also sources cited id. at 58 n. 1. See generallyA Collection and Survey
oJ State Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COLuM. L. Rzv. 347 (1932).
28' Courts are generally reluctant to infer preemption. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,
437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978); see Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 101 S. Ct.
1124, 1130 (1981). Therefore, courts will not "[seek] out conflicts between state and federal
regulation where none clearly exists." Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S.
440, 446 (1960).

1982]

NOTES

859

must then decide whether the challenged state law substantially burdens achievement of the objective.' 90 The national objective behind
federal antitrust laws is the enhancement of competition.'19

In Parker, the Supreme Court decided that true state action
which has anticompetitive effects will not be preempted. 9 2 The
Parker decision represents a recognition that Congress intended to
subordinate competition to true state action.' 93 True state action is
simply never in conflict with the federal antitrust laws since Congress
recognized the paramount importance of permitting states to enact
"anticompetitive" regulatory programs amounting to true state ac-

tion.' 9 4 Accordingly, once a court finds true state action present, the
antitrust preemption inquiry must cease.' 9 5
The Boulder dissent therefore is correct in maintaining that pre-

emption principles should be applied when analyzing true state action
issues. The dissent, however, would treat state statutes amounting to

'9
See Note, Preemption Analysis, supra note 181, at 382-85. If the challenged state statute
requires conduct that the federal statute specifically forbids, it will always burden achievement
of the national objective. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 14349 (1963).
"I' See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (freedom to compete is
guaranteed by antitrust laws); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372
(1963) ("competition is our fundamental national economic policy"); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (free and unfettered competition best serves needs of our
society). See generally Bork, supra note 54 (preservation of competition promotes consumer
satisfaction).
19t 317 U.S. at 350-52. In Parker, the Court did not even consider the anticompetitive effects
of the state prorate program. In fact, the Court assumed that the program would violate the
Sherman Act. See id. at 350.
191See L. TruaE, supra note 181, § 6-24, at 381-82; Slater, supra note 61, at 91.
191Thus, true state action can "'violate" federal antitrust law and still remain effective despite
the doctrine of preemption. Contra Posner, supra note 61, at 703 ("absent persuasive reasons to
the contrary, state regulation should be invalidated whenever it achieves results which, privately
arranged, would violate the antitrust laws").
lit
But see New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978). The New Motor
Vehicle Court decided that California's Automobile Franchise Act regulating the establishment
of automobile dealerships was true state action. Id. at 109. Accordingly, the regulatory scheme
was "outside the reach of the antitrust laws" and not preempted. Id. This determination should
have ended the Court's antitrust preemption analysis, but the Court proceeded to hold that the
regulatory scheme did not irreconcilably conflict with the Sherman Act. Id. at 110-11. This
second holding is unclear. It may be mere dictum or it may be a retreat from the absolute
position that federal antitrust laws have no preemptive effect on true state action.
Although true state action will not be preempted by federal antitrust law, it must still be
scrutinized to determine whether it violates the Constitution or other federal law. See Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (Virginia statutory scheme regulating advertising impermissibly
infringed on one's right to free speech, thus preempted); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973)
(Alabama statutory scheme regulating optometry conflicted with due process clause, thus preempted); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (Arizona statutory scheme regulating
packing procedures for cantaloupes grown in Arizona impermissibly burdens interstate commerce, thus preempted).
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true state action and municipal ordinances identically for preemption
purposes since federalism principles are implicated whenever municipal ordinances or state statutes are invalidated. 96 This approach
exemplifies the dissent's misunderstanding of the true state action
doctrine and leads to an incorrect application of preemption.

The true state action doctrine reflects Congress' intent to allow
states as states to regulate their affairs free from the restraints imposed
by the Sherman Act. 9 7 Implicit in this intent is the congressional
choice to subordinate competition to true state action. Congress has
not chosen to extend to municipal ordinances the deference which has

been granted to true state action. 198 By focusing on the majority's

alleged error in treating state statutes amounting to true state action
and municipal ordinances differently, the dissent misconstrues the
true state action doctrine. The dissent failed to recognize that Congress only intended to grant deference to states as states. Therefore,

although federalism principles are implicated when municipal ordinances are invalidated, the very essence of the true state action doctrine requires municipal ordinances to be more susceptible to invalidation than true state action.
Although municipal ordinances can amount to true state action,
municipalities cannot unilaterally establish a regulatory program constituting true state action. 9 9 In Boulder, the municipality's ordinance was not enacted pursuant to a clearly articulated affirmatively
expressed state policy to displace competition with regulation. Thus, it
did not constitute true state action 00 and the ordinance was not
automatically saved from preemption.
See Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 850 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See id. at 842; Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 411-12.
See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412 n.42.
'"
City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280, 284 (4th Cir. 1977), vacated, 435
'g
U.S. 992 (1978) (command from state body less than state legislature "does not automatically
satisfy the conditions precedent for invocation of the 'state action' doctrine"). Compare New
Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978) (state legislature has power to
form true state action) and Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (state supreme court as coequal branch of government has power to form true state action) with City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (municipality can never establish true state
action) and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (state agency can never establish
true state action). Contra Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 847-51 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (all municipalities, regardless of home rule status, must be able to establish true state action). See generally
Thomas, City of Lafayette's State Action Test Reformulated: A Meaningful Standard of Antitrust Immunity for Cities, 1980 ARiz. ST. L.J. 345, 372-75.
210 102 S. Ct. at 842-43. Since the Boulder majority held that the municipality's ordinance was
not enacted pursuant to a clearly articulated policy, the Court did not "reach the question
whether [Boulder's] ordinance must or could satisfy the 'active state supervision' test." Id. at 811
n.14.
When dealing with municipalities, it is doubtful whether the Court will stress the same
elements of the active state supervision test that it has stressed when examining state statutes and
198

19
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In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist, predicted that this holding
would have serious consequences. Among the consequences predicted
by the dissent were: difficulties in applying per se rules and the rule of
reason test; and the availability of harsh penalities against municipal
defendants. 01 This prediction, however, is unfounded because these
problems can be avoided by using a preemption analysis.
The problem raised by Justice Rehnquist could only arise when
no true state action is present. Merely because no true state action is
involved, however, does not mean that a municipality will be found
to have violated the antitrust laws. Courts must decide when "nontrue state action" which has anticompetitive effects will be preempted. 202 Two Supreme Court cases provide appropriate guidelines

for courts to follow when considering the preemptive effect of federal
20 3
antitrust law on "non-true state action.

rules which apply to private parties. Our federalism will not allow states fiee reign through the
guise of state supervision to pervasively interfere in municipal affairs. See Rogers, supra note 89,
at 340-43; cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Congress cannot exercise
commerce power in manner that interferes with state's ability to conduct integral governmental
affairs).
101 102 S. Ct. at 848-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent also maintained that the
Boulder Court's holding "'will radically alter the relationship between states and their political
subdivisions." Id. at 851 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that a state would
be unable to clearly articulate and affirmatively express a policy displacing competition with
regulation since the state had no power over local matters. See id. Accordingly, to protect
themselves from antitrust challenges, home rule municipalities would have to renounce their
home rule status, thus altering their relationship with the State. Id.
The dissent's argument, however, is flawed in two respects. First, all anticompetitive
municipal ordinances are not necessarily antitrust violations. See infra note 219. Second, home
rule municipalities can ensure that they will receive all powers that the state decides to grant to
non-home rule cities. If a home rule municipality is legislatively created, it will automatically
receive the power that the state subsequently grants to its political subdivision. See 2 E.
McQUILUN supra note 117, § 10.08, at 755. If a home rule municipality is created by charter,
however, the charter must contain a provision granting the home rule municipality all powers
that the state subsequently grants to non-home rule municipalities. See id. § 10.25, at 806. Thus
through proper drafting, a home rule municipality can avail itself of true state action.
202 The Boulder dissent was concerned with the disparate preemption treatment afforded state
statutes and municipal ordinances. Justice Rehnquist observed: "This Court has made no ...
distinction between States and their subdivisions with regard to the preemptive effects of federal
law. The standards applied by this Court are the same regardless of whether the challenged
enactment is that of a State or one of its political subdivisions." Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 850
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
This statement is undoubtedly correct. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411
U.S. 624 (1973); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). Nevertheless, it fails to recognize the distinction between state action and true state action. Once a court
determines that true state action is not present, the same preemption standards will be applied to
state statutes and municipal ordinances.
"' For a discussion of preemption and antitrust principles, see generally, Note, Parker v.
Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164 (1975).
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In Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,204 distributors of liquor sought to enjoin a retailer from selling liquor at a price
different from that fixed by a price schedule. 0 5 Although the price
fixing schedule was authorized by federal and state law, the state
statute was broader than the federal statute.20 6 The federal statute
permitted distributors and retailers to enter into a contract fixing the
retail price of goods whereas the state statute in addition permitted
enforcement of price fixing agreements against all retailers. The state
20 7
statute was therefore an attempt to allow horizontal price fixing.
Although Louisiana had affirmatively expressed this price fixing plan
as its state policy, it did not actively supervise the policy. 20 8 There-

fore, the plan was not true state action and it was subject to further
antitrust preemption analysis. Because horizontal price fixing is a per
20 9
se violation of the antitrust laws, the statute was preempted.
In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,210 the State of Maryland enacted a statute providing that a producer or refiner of petroleum products "may not operate any retail service station within the
state."911 Exxon and other oil companies maintained that because this
statute had anticompetitive effects it violated federal antitrust law
and should be preempted. 21 2 The Court held, however, that mere
anticompetitive effects were not enough to find a statute preempted.
341 U.S. 384 (1951).
215 Id. at 835-86.
204

206 See id. at 386-87.
207 Id. at 389. Horizontal price fixing compels those in competition at the same functional
level to follow a parallel price policy. Id. The Supreme Court has held that this practice is a per
se violation of the Sherman Act. See Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340
U.S. 211 (1951). For a discussion of price fixing and per se violations, see generally, L. SULLIVAN.
supra note 46, §§ 67-70, at 182-94.
'w See 341 U.S. at 386-87. The Louisiana statute fulfilled the "affirmatively expressed"
requirement because the statute declared that it was unfair competition for any retailer with
notice of a price fixing agreement to sell liquor at a price different from the price fixed by any
agreement. Id. at 386-87 & n.2. Therefore, the state had clearly articulated a policy favoring
horizontal price fixing agreements. Nevertheless, since the Louisiana statute left both the initiation and enforcement of the price fixing contracts to the discretion of private parties, it did not
meet the active supervision requirement. See id.
20 See id. at 389.
210 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
211 Id. at 119. The statute also required a producer or refiner of petroleum products to -'extend
all 'voluntary allowances' uniformly to all service stations it supplies." Id. at 119-20. Exxon and
other oil companies argued that the statute should be preempted since compliance with this
statute would force them to violate the Robinson-Patman Act, a specific federal antitrust law.
Id. at 130. The Exxon Court disagreed and held that compliance with the state statute would not
necessarily compel the oil companies to violate federal antitrust law. See id. at 130-31; see also
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45-46 (1966).
'2 See 437 U.S. at 129. Maryland did not claim that the statute was true state action. Thus,
the Exxon Court had no reason to apply the Midcal test.

NOTES

19821

863

The Court stated: "[A)n adverse effect on competition ...[is not] in
and of itself, enough to render a state statute invalid, [otherwise] the
States' power3 to engage in economic regulation would be effectively
destroyed."

21

Schwegmann and Exxon signify that the Supreme Court will
apply the same per se rule and rule of reason test when examining
state action and action by private parties. The Schwegmann Court
held that a Louisiana statute authorizing conduct amounting to a per
se violation of the Sherman Act was preempted by the Act.01 4 The
Court concentrated on the nature of the anticompetitive effects, and
not on the presence of state action. 215 Because the anticompetitive
effects were so pernicious, the Court held the statute to be preempted
despite the presence of state action. In Exxon, the Supreme Court was
not confronted with a per se violation of the Sherman Act, thus the
Court had the opportunity to outline the parameters of the rule of
reason test as applied to state action. Traditional rule of reason analysis requires "the factfinder [to weigh] all of the circumstances of a case
in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as
imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition." 1 8 The Exxon
Court simply decided that the Maryland statute did not place an
unreasonable restraint on competition.2 17 Thus, the Exxon Court
employed the traditional rule of reason test to determine whether the
state action had enough of an anticompetitive effect to warrant pre218

emption.

In addition to providing workable standards for per se and rule of
reason analysis, an application of preemption principles will provide
an appropriate remedy for antitrust violative state action. Although
Justice Rehnquist's assertion that treble damage liability for municipalities would be forthcoming if the majority's analysis were accepted

Id. at 133.
211341 U.S. at 389.
21- See id. If the conduct has manifestly anticompetitive effects, per se rules of illegality are
appropriate. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977); see also
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (due to its anticompetitive effects,
211

certain conduct presumed to be per se violation of Sherman Act).
216 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
117 See Exxon, 437 U.S. at 113: Shell Oil Co. v. Younger, 587 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947 (1979); Exxon Corp. v. Georgia Assoc. of Petroleum
Retailers, 484 F. Supp. 1008 (N.D. Ga. 1979), affd sub nom. Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F.2d
1030 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 430 (1981).
I'l Although Exxon established that private conduct and state action will be subject to the
same rule of reason test, results may vary depending on the defendant's identity. Lafayette, 435
U.S. at 417 n.48.
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is premature,2 1 9 the specter of treble damage liability looms on the

horizon. Preemption analysis will prevent a court from subjecting
municipalities to treble damage liability. 220 Once a court decides that
state action unreasonably restricts competition, the statute, regula2
tion, or ordinance will be preempted by the Sherman Act. '

Although the Supreme Court has employed exemption language
when analyzing the true state action doctrine, the Court has in reality
applied preemption principles. The Supreme Court has recognized
that Congress' intent when enacting the Sherman Act was to allow
states as states to formulate and apply anticompetitive policies free
from the strictures imposed by the Sherman Act. Thus, as long as the
state clearly articulates and affirmatively expresses a policy displacing
competition with regulation and actively supervises this policy, the
Sherman Act will not preempt this regulation. If the court holds that
the true state action test is not met, the state action will be further
examined. A court will determine whether the state action irreconcilably conflicts with the Sherman Act. If it does, it will be preempted.
The antitrust preemption test as formulated in Schwegmann and
Exxon provides a clear and workable test for determining when state
action will be invalidated. Schwegmann and Exxon further demonstrate that the Sherman Act will not prevent state and local governments from enacting anticompetitive statutes, ordinances, and regulations provided these enactments do not unreasonably restrain
competition. Finally, application of preemption principles will avoid
the undesirable result of imposing treble damages on municipalities.
Michael M. DiCicco
21z Once a court determines that true state action is not present, this determination does not
demand that a court find an antitrust violation present. See supra note 152; see also Pinehurst
Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air. Servs. 476 F. Supp. 543, 555 & n.21 (M.D.N.C. 1979) (mere fact
that antitrust exemption is not present does not mean that antitrust violation has occurred):
Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025, 1040 (N.D. Tex. 1978) ("This opinion does
not hold that the present arrangement is [violative of antitrust laws); it only holds that it must
stand for antitrust inspection").
220 It is beyond the scope of this Note to speculate on the antitrust liability of private parties
operating under a preempted statute, regulation or ordinance. For a discussion of liability of
private parties operating under a preempted statute, see I P. AR.EEA & D. TuaRNs, supra note
139, 217(b), at 108-14; Note, supra note 209, at 1176 n.73.
2' See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNRa, supra note 135,
209, at 60 & 217(a)(2), at 103.

